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This paper analyses the publicly available data on the distribution and evolution of highly pathogenic
avian inﬂuenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 clades, whilst acknowledging the biases resulting from the non-
random selection of isolates for gene sequencing. The data indicate molecular heterogeneity in the global
distribution of HPAIV H5N1, in particular in different parts of East and Southeast Asia. Analysis of the
temporal pattern of haemagglutinin clade data shows a progression from clade 0 (the ‘dominant’ clade
between 1996 and 2002) to clade 1 (2003–2005) and then to clade 2.3.4 (2005 onwards). This process
continuously produces variants, depending on the frequency of virus multiplication in the host popula-
tion, which is inﬂuenced by geographical variation in poultry density, poultry production systems and
also HPAI risk management measures such as vaccination. Increased multilateral collaboration needs
to focus on developing enhanced disease surveillance and control targeted at evolutionary ‘hotspots’.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
Since its emergence over a decade ago, the highly pathogenic
avian inﬂuenza virus (HPAIV) strain type H5N1 has spread to 61
countries across three continents, been associated with more than
290 human fatalities,1 and resulted in disease mortality and culling
of several hundred million domestic poultry. Epidemiological studies
conducted in a wide range of settings have provided important in-
sights with respect to the complex interplay between wild bird
and domestic poultry species within the various ecological systems
where the virus has led to outbreaks (Sims et al., 2005; Martin
et al., 2006; Alexander and Brown, 2009).
The epidemiological characteristics of the virus, including host
range, survival in the environment, minimum infectious dose, path-
ogenicity and excretion rates, appear to support its large-scale
endemicity within some ecosystems, such as the rice–paddy ﬁeld
production systems of Southeast Asia (Gilbert et al., 2008). There
is a relatively small probability that such systems contain speciﬁc
species reservoirs of infection, such as wild bird species. It is more
likely that presence of disease at a larger geographical scale is the
result of spatially and temporally dynamic pockets of infection,
which result from illegal movement of infected poultry or their_inﬂuenza/country/cases_
-NC-ND license.products, as well as, probably, the occasional exchange with in-
fected wild birds (Gauthier-Clerc et al., 2007). National and multi-
lateral agencies have responded in many ways to this zoonotic
health and economic risk, and important lessons have already been
and still need to be learned about disease control policy
effectiveness.
HPAI is caused by an RNA virus with a relatively high rate of
nucleotide substitution. The resultant accumulation of random
mutations within the eight segments of its small genome com-
bined with natural selection pressure inﬂuenced by host immunity
responses results in variability of salient characteristics, including
antigenicity, infectivity and virulence (Holmes, 2010). Since the
putative introduction of the HPAIV H5N1 into Southeast Asia from
China and its subsequent spread to South Asia, Europe and Africa, a
large number of virus isolates has been genotyped. The genetic var-
iability and relatedness of the virus isolates elucidates the paths of
its spread and entrenchment in different ecological niches, partic-
ularly in Southeast and South Asia. Realising this, Bogner et al.
(2006), Capua et al. (2006) and Capua and Alexander (2008)
emphasized the need to make genetic data available to the global
research community.
In this review article, we use published data to perform a qual-
itative analysis of the spatio-temporal distribution of HPAIV H5N1
clades as deﬁned by nucleotide sequence variability of the hae-
magglutinin (HA) gene with the aim to identify patterns that can
be used to develop more effective control and prevention strate-
gies. The HA gene was used due it being the primary target of
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were generated using the methodology deﬁned by the WHO/OIE/
FAO H5N1 Evolution Working Group (2008, 2009). The underlying
classiﬁcation algorithm was applied by Lu et al. (2007a,b) who
make regularly updated data publicly available via the FluGenome
website.2 In the current analysis, the data were complemented by
data published by Wan et al. (2008), Nguyen et al. (2008), Saito
et al. (2008) and Gutiérrez et al. (2009).
Evolution and global spread of HPAIV H5N1
The evolution of inﬂuenza viruses is inﬂuenced by the interplay
of high virus mutation rates, natural selection and host population
characteristics, such as species susceptibility and population con-
tact structure. This is either reﬂected in so-called antigenic drift
or in exchange of HA or neuraminidase (NA) antigens between
different inﬂuenza A virus sub-types co-infecting a particular
host resulting in genetic re-assortment, also called antigenic shift
(Treanor, 2004; Nelson and Holmes, 2007; McHardy and Adams,
2009).
Antigenic drift is common in inﬂuenza A and B viruses, and is
primarily responsible for seasonal ﬂu epidemics since it affects
the HA and NA genes responsible for the main surface proteins
to which host immunity and vaccines are directed. Genetic re-
assortment can produce new inﬂuenza A viruses, such as in the
case of the recent pandemic inﬂuenza A H1N1v outbreak. Both
mechanisms, antigenic drift and genetic re-assortment, to varying
degrees result in unpredictable changes to virus behaviour such as
transmissibility, host range, virulence, treatment and vaccine efﬁ-
cacy. With the current HPAIV H5N1 epidemic, antigenic drift still
appears to be the main mechanism, and there is scientiﬁc evidence
that it has already resulted in changes in virus behaviour, such as
effectiveness of treatment in humans (see, for example, Le et al.,
2008; Boltz et al., 2010).
Phylogenetic and phylodynamic analyses based on comparisons
between HPAIV H5N1 genotypes have been reported by several
authors, including Smith et al. (2006), Duan et al. (2008), Gutiérrez
et al. (2009), Guan et al. (2009), and Liang et al. (2010). Most recent
analyses are based on the nucleotide sequence variability of the HA
surface gene and apply a set of criteria for deﬁning HA clade groups
devised by a WHO/OIE/FAO H5N1 Evolution Working Group (2008,
2009). In brief, the phylogenetic analysis has led to the deﬁnition of
lineages emerging from the earliest known progenitor isolate iden-
tiﬁed in the 1996 Guangdong outbreak (A/goose/Guangdong/96).
Amongst these, a comparison of nucleotide distances at the HA lo-
cus within and between groupings of sample sequences using a
phylogenetic tree resulted in the identiﬁcation of at least 10 clades
(Wan et al., 2008; Vijaykrishna et al., 2008). HA clade 0 includes
those isolates which are genetically close to the progenitor virus,
i.e. A/goose/Guangdong/96, which itself is believed to have
emerged through introduction of low pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
virus H5N1 from wild bird into domestic poultry populations in
China (Guan et al., 2009). Each clade may encompass a number
of subclades as well as sub-subclades.
Analysis of the temporal and spatial distribution of different
clades can support the development of hypotheses about spread
patterns within and between countries and regions (Smith et al.,
2006; Ducatez et al., 2007; Salzberg et al., 2007; Wallace and Fitch,
2008; Buchy et al., 2009; Cattoli et al., 2009). The relative fre-
quency of different clades within countries and regions can offer
indications with respect to frequency of local transmission as dis-
tinct from introductions from other geographical areas.
It should be noted that the criteria for selection of sequenced
isolates included in the database used for this analysis are not doc-2 See: http://www.ﬂugenome.org.umented. It is also unlikely that the isolates are a representative
sample of the spatial or temporal distribution of HPAIV H5N1 in
the population at risk of any of the countries. This drawback needs
to be kept in mind when interpreting the clade patterns discussed
here. If a clade was reported frequently, it cannot be concluded
with certainty, due to the absence of representative sampling, that
it is common or ‘dominant’ at a particular time in a particular geo-
graphical area. In addition, there are various sources of selection
bias, including some countries not submitting any gene sequences
during selected time periods. For example, for 2009, at the time of
writing, only gene sequences from Egypt were available in publicly
accessible databases, which should not be interpreted as indicating
that none of the other countries experienced any outbreaks.
Due to public health concerns, it is also more likely that virus
isolates from human cases were sequenced than from animals. De-
spite these caveats, a detailed assessment of the space–time distri-
bution allows some important inferences about regional dynamics
of HPAIV H5N1 risk. In the current analysis, the main focus was
placed on a comparative assessment of the relative occurrence of
different clades within-country rather than of individual counts
between countries, since the number of sequences varied substan-
tially between countries. Due to the relatively small number of iso-
lates per country and year, rare clade types were less likely to be
detected and therefore any inferences are mainly about the com-
mon clade types. Holmes and Grenfell (2009) acknowledge the
biases inherent to many molecular epidemiology studies of RNA
viruses, particularly in relation to assessing spatial dynamics, but
still ﬁnd them useful for interpretation of epidemiological patterns.
As can be seen in Table 1, all 10 HPAIV H5N1 clades have been
isolated in East Asia at one time or another. The sequences from
East Asia are primarily from China and Hong Kong, with the excep-
tion of clade 2.2whichwas also found in Japan and South Korea. The
only clades that have not been found in East Asia (namely China,
including Hong Kong) are 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, which appear to have
evolved in Indonesia after their putative introduction from Hunan
province of China in 2002–2003 (Wang et al., 2008). Some clades
have so far only been isolated in China (e.g. clades 4, 6 and 9) whilst
members of the clades associated with major epidemics (clade 1 in
the Mekong region in 2004 and 2005, clade 2.1 in Indonesia as of
2004, clade 2.2 extending from Asia to Europe and Africa starting
in 2005, and clade 2.3.4 affecting Vietnam, Lao PDR and Thailand
since 2005)were all isolated in China before being found elsewhere.
Table 1 and Fig. 1 reveal the global dispersion of HPAIV H5N1.
Despite having infected many countries the number of clades,
and therefore the genetic variability of the virus, causing outbreaks
outside East and Southeast Asia, is much smaller than within that
geographic region. Indeed, nearly all gene-sequenced isolates ob-
tained west of Myanmar at the time of writing are drawn from a
single clade group (2.2). This suggests that the high transmission
frequencies in some parts of East and Southeast Asia resulting from
high population densities of terrestrial and aquatic poultry com-
bined with regional husbandry and trading practices have led to in-
creased chances of antigenic drift. Indeed, the three southern
provinces of China, namely, Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong,
alone have a combined standing poultry population of more than
600 million domestic poultry, similar in size to that of India as a
whole. The development of genetic diversity of HPAIV H5N1 in
China has been analysed by Chen et al. (2006), Duan et al. (2008)
and Guan et al. (2009).
Based on the above, the following three hypotheses about
HPAIV H5N1 evolution and epidemiology can be formulated:
1. The risk for emergence of HPAI H5N1 re-assortant viruses may
be particularly high in regions with higher clade diversity, per-
haps justifying more intensive use of multilateral resources for
disease surveillance and control in these areas.
Table 1
Temporal pattern of occurrence of HPAIV H5N1 clades in poultry and humans by geographical region. Source: Data from http://H5N1.ﬂugenome.org (accessed 14th April 2010)
plus additional data on Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar from Gutiérrez et al. (2009) and Saito et al. (2008).
Region Clade 1996–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
East Asia 0 51 17 18 17 5 4 1 1 1
1 17 16
2.1.1 1 1
2.2 20 9 4
2.3.1 1 3 13
2.3.2 1 11 43 3
2.3.3 1 6
2.3.4 47 105 21
2.4 2 14 9 2
2.5 8 8 3
3 3 41 1
4 7 1 1 7
5 1 2 2 5 16
6 1 8
7 2 4 9 3
8 7 1
9 1 2 7 16 9 1
Outliers 2 8 8 4 1
Southeast Asia 0 3 5
1 13 283 157 18 26 14
2.1.1 11 16 7 1
2.1.2 2 22 18
2.1.3 6 34 110 15
2.3.2 14 1
2.3.4 10 3 27
3 2
5 1 1
7 1
8 1
Outliers 2
South Asia 1 1
2.2 5 14 29
Europe 1 4
2.2 52 158 37
Central Asia 2.2 7 8
West Asia 2.2 1 20 4 2
North Africa 2.2 1 50 87 53 44
West Africa 2.2 112 67 2
East Africa 2.2 1
Total 51 21 66 65 96 397 461 641 302 101 44
Fig. 1. Global dispersion of HPAIV H5N1 clades together with cumulative spatial distribution of highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 outbreaks in poultry
and wild birds between 2003 and 2009 (density of outbreaks shaded between yellow (low but >0) and dark blue (high) and isolated outbreaks shown as red dots).
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Table 2
Cost of human HPAI H5N1 epidemics in selected countries assuming three hypothetical mortality scenarios.
Country Human population (millions) HPAI H5N1-related deaths
(million)a
GDP per capita (US$) SVLb (US$ million) Cost of human epidemic (US$ billion)a
1% 0.5% 0.1% 1% 0.5% 0.1%
USA 304 3.04 1.52 0.30 47,000 6.90 20988 10,494 2099
China 1339 13.39 6.70 1.34 6000 0.88 11798 5899 1180
Japan 127 1.27 0.64 0.13 34200 5.02 6392 3196 639
India 1166 11.66 5.83 1.17 2800 0.41 4792 2396 479
Germany 82 0.82 0.41 0.08 34800 5.11 4210 2105 421
UK 61 0.61 0.30 0.06 36,600 5.37 3276 1638 328
Russia 140 1.40 0.70 0.14 15,800 2.32 3248 1624 325
France 64 0.64 0.32 0.06 32,700 4.80 3088 1544 309
Brazil 199 1.99 0.99 0.20 10,100 1.48 2951 1475 295
Mexico 111 1.11 0.56 0.11 14,200 2.08 2319 1159 232
Thailand 66 0.66 0.33 0.07 8500 1.25 819 410 82
Pakistan 176 1.76 0.88 0.18 2600 0.38 673 336 67
Egypt 83 0.83 0.42 0.08 5400 0.79 659 329 66
Vietnam 87 0.87 0.44 0.09 2800 0.41 358 179 36
Israel 7 0.07 0.04 0.01 28,200 4.14 305 153 31
Total 4014 40.14 20.07 4.01 65,875 32,937 6587
a Three scenarios, high HPAI H5N1-speciﬁc mortality: 1% of human population dies, e.g. 2% affected, 50% case fatality; medium HPAI H5N1-speciﬁc mortality: 0.5% of
human population dies; low HPAI H5N1-speciﬁc mortality: 0.1% of human population dies.
b SVL, ‘statistical’ value of life.
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also found elsewhere may indicate that transboundary linkages
(probably through poultry trade and/or wild bird movements)
are important determinants of local and regional HPAI H5N1
disease dynamics.
3. Medium to long-term local re-occurrence of outbreaks associ-
ated with a single clade (or subclade) is probably a sign of
endemicity.
Cost of emergence of HPAIV H5N1 transmissibility between humans
Fortunately, HPAIV H5N1 currently does not transmit easily
from poultry to humans and there has been no proven human-
to-human transmission. Consequently, the number of reported hu-
man cases has been very small considering the large number of
people exposed to poultry in the affected regions, through keeping,
trading or purchasing them in live bird markets. However, the pos-
sibility of acquisition of higher transmissibility to and between hu-
mans by the virus still remains, either through antigenic drift or,
more likely, through re-assortment with other inﬂuenza A viruses
circulating in humans and/or domestic animals, such as pigs,
which are also abundant in East and Southeast Asia. If such an
event were combined with high human case fatality (around
50%), it would result in extremely high human epidemic costs even
in low incidence scenarios.
Orders of magnitude of the cost of human HPAI H5N1 epidemics
can be derived using the ‘statistical value of life approach’ (Sproul
et al., 2009), which assigns a monetary value to the life (or death)
of an ‘average citizen’ in relation to a country’s economic situation.
Based on this (admittedly simplistic) approach, the cost of a ‘low’
incidence human HPAIV H5N1 epidemic (0.2% of the human popu-
lation become infected, half of which die – by comparison, seasonal
ﬂu tends to infect about 10% of a population) in China PDR would
amount to US$11803 billion from mortality alone. For Vietnam, the
same scenario would result in a human epidemic costing US$36 bil-
lion while for the USA, the cost of such an epidemic would be higher
than US$2000 billion (Table 2).3 $1 = approx. £0.64, €0.76 at 19th December 2010.Evolution and dispersion of HPAIV H5N1 in the Greater Mekong Sub-
Region
Table 3 tabulates clade identiﬁcation in China and the other Me-
kong countries between 1996 and 2008. It shows the link between
the occurrence of clades in China and its neighbour Vietnam, but
also that the Mekong countries are likely to have been a reservoir
for clade 1 between 2003 and 2008. For the geographical region it
reveals a progression from clade 0 (the ‘dominant’ clade between
1996 and 2002) to clade 1 (2003–2008) and then to clade 2.3.4
(2005 onwards). The number of clades in this region and their tran-
sition both suggest high frequency transmission of virus, generat-
ing successful new genetic variants through a process involving
high mutation rates typical for RNA viruses and positive selection
(Nelson and Holmes, 2007; Holmes, 2010). This phenomenon has
been recognised for human inﬂuenza A virus where the presence
of a continuous infection reservoir in East and Southeast Asia has
been hypothesized (Rambaut et al., 2008; Russell et al., 2008;
Holmes, 2009). Nevertheless, it has recently been postulated that
for human inﬂuenza A virus evolution the high migration rates
amongst the human population combined with use of antiviral
treatment have probably resulted in other regions, such as the
USA, also becoming important (Bedford et al., 2010).
Nevertheless, in the case of HPAIV H5N1, neither the limited
movement of domestic poultry nor the migration of wild birds is
likely to have a dispersal capacity for the virus that is anywhere
near to human movement, as has been eminently demonstrated
by the rapid spread of inﬂuenza A H1N1v amongst humans in
2009 across the globe (Lemey et al., 2009). The presence of a con-
tinuous reservoir of HPAIV H5N1 in East and Southeast Asia poses a
serious on-going challenge for disease risk management and, from
a pandemic perspective, should be a focal point for intensive policy
intervention. Moreover, in light of the public good nature of conta-
gious disease prevention, it suggests an essential area for multilat-
eral cooperation.
Fig. 2 depicts the spatial distribution of HPAI outbreaks in the
Greater Mekong Sub-Region during the initial epidemic waves
(2004–2005) and the subsequent phase of reduced outbreak inci-
dence (2006–2009). Two major HPAI ‘hotspots’ remain in Vietnam,
one in the north (Red river delta) and one in the south (Mekong river
delta). These are characterised by highly productive smallholder
Fig. 2. Spatial distribution of highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 outbreaks (black dots) in poultry and wild birds in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region for the
periods 2004–2005 and 2006–2009 (based on ofﬁcial government reports to OIE).
Table 3
Temporal pattern of HPAIV H5N1 clades in animals and humans in China (incl. Hong Kong) and the Mekong countries. Source: Data from http://H5N1.ﬂugenome.org (accessed
13th April 2010) plus data from Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar from Gutiérrez et al. (2009), Nguyen et al. (2008) and Saito et al. (2008).
Country Clade 1996–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
China 0 51 17 18 17 5 4 1 1 1
1 17 16
2.1.1 1 1
2.2 20 5 3
2.3.1 1 3 13
2.3.2 1 11 43 3
2.3.3 1 6
2.3.4 47 105 19
2.4 2 14 9 2
2.5 5 2 3
3 3 41 1
4 7 1 1 7
5 1 2 2 4 16
6 1 8
7 2 4 9 2
8 7 1
9 1 2 7 16 9 1
Outliers 2 8 8 4 1
Cambodia 1 4 4 1
Laos 2.3.4 1
Myanmar 2.3.4 3
7 1
Vietnam 0 3
1 13 102 81 4 20
2.3.2 14 1
2.3.4 10 21
3 2
5 1 1
8 1
Thailand 1 179 72 10 5 14
2.3.4 2 2
Total 51 21 66 65 81 359 337 149 75 15
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aquatic poultry (Pfeiffer et al., 2007).
Differences in the relative importance of clades types within
these hot spots are illustrated in Table 4, although it should benoted that locational information was only available for a small
subset of sequenced isolates. Given that caveat, Table 4 should
be examined considering the occurrence of different clades in
neighbouring countries. Clade 1 was ﬁrst reported from China in
Table 4
Subset of HPAIV H5N1 clades with province location information from Vietnam from
animals and humans by geographical region. Source: Combined data from Wan et al.
(2008), Nguyen et al. (2008) and http://H5N1.ﬂugenome.org (accessed 14th April
2010).
Region Clade 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
North 1 13 12 12
2.3.2 1
2.3.4 21
5 2
Central 1 7
2.3.4 1
South 1 31 24 5 19
2.3.4 1
314 D.U. Pfeiffer et al. / The Veterinary Journal 190 (2011) 309–3162002. It has been the ‘dominant’ clade in Thailand and Vietnam
since 2003, but has not been reported from China since that year.
Table 4 reveals that ‘dominant’ clade transition in northern Viet-
nam mirrors that of its northern neighbour (from clade 1 to clade
2.3.4), while in southern Vietnam clade 1, the agent of the initial
epidemic waves, persists (which mirrors the situation of Thailand
and Cambodia). This comparison evokes a number of policy impli-
cations, the most prominent of which are that there are important
transboundary linkages between China and northern Vietnam
(with Lao PDR having an intermediary role), and that HPAIV
H5N1 is endemic in southern Vietnam’s Mekong river delta, and
thereby is likely to have become a recurrent source of infection
for Cambodia, in particular.
Given that the role of wild birds in disease spread is likely to be
of minor importance within the Greater Mekong Sub-Region and
that governments have banned trade of poultry or poultry products
across their borders, transboundary spread of HPAIV H5N1 must
result primarily from informal movements of poultry and poultry
products across country borders.
These ﬁndings reinforce a perception that disease risk manage-
ment in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region could be more effective
with a multilateral approach that limits re-infection risk and,
where possible, coordinates activities to an extent that facilitates
containment and possibly progressive eradication.Deﬁning HPAI risk categories
Our assessment of the combined effects of viral evolution and
spatial dispersion presents a heterogeneous global landscape of
HPAI H5N1 disease risk, and policies toward both livestock sector
defence and pandemic aversion must adapt to this reality. To facil-
itate more effective policy design, we propose a classiﬁcation
scheme for functional differences in national and within-country
HPAI H5N1 disease situations and ‘risks’ which is shown in Table 5.
According to this classiﬁcation, policy orientation toward poultryTable 5
Classiﬁcation scheme for functional differences in national and within-country highly pat
Risk
category
Deﬁnitiona Econ
0 No past or current HPAIV H5N1 outbreak occurrence (in last
5 years)
Non
1 Past outbreaks, but no current outbreaks or discernable reservoir
risk (in last 5 years)
Negl
2 Current, recurrent, or proximate (<6 months) outbreaks Poul
cost
3 Apparently endemic: persistent localized recurrence of known
clades with discernable reservoir potential
Poul
cost
4 Endemic and signiﬁcant evolutionary pressures: appearance of
novel clades
Poul
cost
a Assumes adequate sensitivity of surveillance.sector protection can be stratiﬁed into preventive (Categories 0
and 1) and reactive (Categories 2–4) regimes. The former would
emphasize managing ‘inbound’ risk with a focus on transboundary
risk management, surveillance for early disease detection and lim-
ited commitments to contingent response. In the second group,
more extensive commitments are required to respond to and con-
tain current outbreaks, possibly including multilateral coordina-
tion to limit transboundary transmission.
For the two highest categories (3 and 4), intensive measures
need to be targeted toward containment and eradication of local
reservoirs, combined with transboundary risk management. In this
context, rigorous assessments are required to determine if and
how to tackle endemicity and conditions that sustain virus reser-
voirs. Without these investments, risks of both re-infection and
development of HPAIV strains capable of human-to-human spread
will continue to present very high present-value social costs.
Again, multilateral commitments may be necessary to more effec-
tively avert or limit these risks. Countries in these two categories
currently include, for example, Vietnam, Thailand, China and
Indonesia.
Categories 3 and 4 countries may also have to resort to preven-
tive large-scale vaccination programmes, because the contact net-
work within the poultry production and trade system is so intense
in space and time that virus transmission cannot be prevented
through other control measures. But the use of this control option
needs to be evaluated and planned carefully, particularly if it has to
be applied over very large geographical areas and diverse poultry
production systems (Savill et al., 2006; Chen, 2009; Hinrichs
et al., 2010; Walker et al., 2010). In such conditions, inadequate
and/or spatially varying vaccination coverage is likely to result in
prolonged virus endemicity at low incidence levels, which will re-
quire long-term continuation of the large-scale vaccination cam-
paign, typically associated with further decreasing coverage due
to decreasing support from stakeholders in the absence of ‘visible’
outbreaks. At the same time, this virus endemicity in the presence
of poorly cross-protective vaccination may increase selection pres-
sure towards virus variants (or ‘escape mutants’), against which
the vaccine does not protect (Smith et al., 2006; Restif and Grenfell,
2007; Iwami et al., 2009; Domenech et al., 2009).
Category 4 countries are a special regional and global priority
for co-ordinated disease risk management. Because they represent
the most dynamic evolutionary conditions for the virus, it is of glo-
bal interest to support these countries in their containment and
eradication efforts. Conversely, Category 4 countries have special
responsibilities to make full use of multilateral resources, sustain
constructive and open policy dialogue, and adhere to international
standards for timely information sharing.
In the presence of signiﬁcant variation in poultry density, trade
patterns and production systems within a country, it may be nec-
essary to sub-divide a country into regions with different riskhogenic avian inﬂuenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 disease situations and ‘risks’.
omic/public health impact Direction of
spread
Re-assortment risk
ranking
e Inbound Negligible
igible Inbound Negligible
try population losses and/or vaccination
s
Inbound and
outbound
Very low
try population losses and/or vaccination
s, public health costs
Outbound Medium
try population losses and/or vaccination
s, public health costs
Outbound Higher than all
other categories
D.U. Pfeiffer et al. / The Veterinary Journal 190 (2011) 309–316 315categories, and develop tailored prevention and control policies for
each.Conclusions
While the design of effective control and prevention strategies
for infectious diseases needs to be informed by epidemiological
analysis and modelling research at animal level, additional essen-
tial insight into transmission dynamics can be provided by com-
bining epidemiological with phylogenetic data. In the case of
RNA viruses with high mutation rates, such as HPAIV H5N1, impor-
tant effects may be inferred at large and small spatial and temporal
scales, as discussed in this review. In addition, if vaccination is used
as part of a control and prevention strategy for such virus diseases,
phylogenetic analysis also becomes important for surveillance,
since the vaccine may only be efﬁcacious for a relatively narrow
range of genetic variants which in turn results in selection pressure
for variants against which the vaccine does not cross-protect.
It is acknowledged that the data analysed here is likely to be af-
fected by signiﬁcant selection bias, but the evidence is sufﬁciently
robust to inform HPAI H5N1 risk management in the Greater
Mekong Sub-Region. In particular, it is apparent that the great diver-
sity of HPAIV clades combined with the large and rapidly growing
poultry populations in the region signiﬁcantly increases the impor-
tance of regional policy dialogue and coordination. Without this,
national risk management approaches, particularly in the northern
provinces of Vietnam and southern China, will be of limited effec-
tiveness, result in signiﬁcant economic costs for national govern-
ments and other stakeholders and domestic and international
public resources cannot be effectively utilized.
Without regional coordination, risk of re-infection with HPAIV
H5N1 and the advent of new virus strains will impose costs on
individual countries that will not allow lasting disease abatement.
Therefore, individual governments and multilateral agencies
should make determined efforts to support regional management
of transboundary risk and coordination of national efforts to limit
HPAIV H5N1 incidence.
Ideally, risk management policy adaptation should be evidence-
based, but current global and regional HPAIV H5N1 policies do not
appear to take sufﬁcient account of geographic variability in
molecular virus characteristics. Most of the currently observed
clades have been identiﬁed only in China, Thailand and Vietnam,
with the majority conﬁned to China. All three countries have had
to commit very substantial human, ﬁnancial and science resources
towards dealing with this challenge for several years now, and
been able to reduce, but not eliminate the risk at a regional level.
The international community needs to recognise that this situation
continues to pose a serious on-going challenge for HPAIV H5N1
risk management and, from a pandemic risk perspective, should
be a focal point for intensive dialogue, effective knowledge ex-
change and coordinated intervention. Moreover, in light of the
public good nature of contagious disease prevention, it suggests
an essential area for multilateral cooperation.Conﬂict of interest statement
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